

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB 4/21/57*

DATE: June 20, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *R3*SUBJECT: OUTLAWING COMMUNIST PARTY
IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Tolson	✓
Nichols	✓
Boardman	✓
Belmont	✓
Mason	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Rosen	✓
Tamm	✓
Nease	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Holloman	✓
Gandy	✓

The "Washington News" of June 19, 1957, carried an editorial reflecting that President Garcia signed into law a bill outlawing completely the Communist Party in the Philippine Islands. The Director noted "See if we can get a copy."

On June 20, 1957, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section requested Mr. Walter E. Jessop, State, to attempt to obtain a copy of this bill for us. He stated that he will try to locate such a bill at State and, if necessary, he will send a cablegram to Manila asking that it be sent.

ACTION:

For information. This matter will be followed by Liaison.

- EXP*
OHB:bjt *bjt*
(6)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 - 1 - Mr. Branigan
 - 1 - Liaison Section
 - 1 - Mr. Bartlett

ENCLOSURE *59*57 JUN 26 1957 *56*

EX-121

RECORDED-59
INDEXED-59

EX-121

64-200-239-298
JUN 25 1957

MESSAGE FROM GARCIA

IN the face of Supreme Court decisions on domestic communism, the action taken today by Philippines President Garcia stands out impressively.

President Garcia signed into law a bill outlawing completely the Communist Party in his country.

This may have come as a surprise to Americans who thought the Philippines no longer were troubled by the communist menace.

But as Mr. Garcia said, tho they have broken up "armed" communism, "we find ourselves seriously handicapped in countering effectively the more insidious activities of Communists who have ostensibly forsworn violence and sought expediently the protection of the very laws of the land which they seek to destroy."

In such fashion apparently the American Communists have beguiled the majority of our Supreme Court Justices. The Communists disavow violence, conspiracy or ties with Moscow. And the high court seems to regard them as no more menacing than just another political party with dissenting views.

From long and bloody experience, the Filipinos know better. Their conclusion, as President Garcia puts it, is that "Communism remains a real and continuing threat to the national security." Communism's world-wide aims are indivisible, wherever the area of their operations, whether in the Philippines or the United States.

"Communist sources, as well as the evidence of our own experiences," says President Garcia, "establish the fact that the objectives of communism are the destruction of our social, political and economic system, and their replacement by a foreign and godless ideology guided and directed from abroad."

In outlawing the party, all necessary safeguards are taken for preservation of Philippine civil rights. As pointed out by the able successor to the late President Magsaysay—"himself an ardent champion of the democratic processes—"the legitimate exercise by citizens of their rights shall remain inviolate.

"What the present law punishes is not dissent nor heresy but subversion and conspiracy."

So speaks a leader wise in the ways of the Communists.

Tolson ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Boardman ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Parsons ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tamm ☒
 Trotter ☒
 Nease ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Holloman ☒
 Gandy ☒

Robch

See if we can get a copy.

ENCLOSURE

64-200-239-298

3 JUN 25 1957

Wash. Post and Times Herald ☒
 Wash. News ☒ 32
 Wash. Star ☒
 N. Y. Herald Tribune ☒
 N. Y. Journal-American ☒
 N. Y. Mirror ☒
 N. Y. Daily News ☒
 N. Y. Times ☒
 Daily Worker ☒
 The Worker ☒
 New Leader ☒

Date JUN 19 1957

RECORDED-59
EX-131

*Memo Roach to Belmont
6-20-57 O.H.B./tjt*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *6-27-57*

DATE: June 25, 1957

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ab*SUBJECT: OUTLAWING THE COMMUNIST PARTY
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDSReferral/Direct *210*

Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Boardman	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mohr	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Parsons	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Rosen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Tamm	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Trotter	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Nease	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Holloman	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Gandy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Pursuant to the Director's request we have obtained
[redacted] a copy of the bill outlawing
the Communist Party (CP) in the Philippine Islands, which is
attached.

This law is known as the Anti-Subversion Act. It points out that the CP of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and violence, but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. The continued existence and activities of the CP of the Philippines is deemed to constitute a clear, present and grave danger to the country. The law specifically states that the CP of the Philippines, including its military arm, the Hukbalahaps, and any other organizations having the same purpose and their successors are declared illegal and outlawed.

The law also prohibits the furnishing of false evidence in any action under the act. It also provides that within 30 days after the enactment of the act any member of the CP may renounce his membership in writing before certain officials. Such renunciation shall then exempt such persons from the "penal sanction" of the act. The law finally provides that nothing in the act shall be interpreted as a restriction to freedom of thought, of assembly, and of association for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the Constitution. Violations of this act calls for the death penalty under certain circumstances.

OBSERVATIONS:

There does not appear to be any basic principle of law involved in the Philippine law which is not incorporated by law, or judicial interpretation, in the Smith Act of 1940

Enclosure *sent 6-27-57*

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Simpson

RECORDED - 39

INDEXED - 39

JUN 28 1957

5 RDS:pw pw

461 8

1957-56

CP - PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Memorandum to Mr. Boardman
RE: OUTLAWING THE COMMUNIST PARTY
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

and the Internal Security Act of 1950. These acts were designed to combat any organization which teaches, advocates or encourages the overthrow or destruction of the Government by force or violence. Through judicial determinations it has been held that the activities of such organizations must present a clear and present danger to the security of the U.S. The Philippine Congress, however, in enacting the above law has made a specific determination that the CP of the Philippines is not a political party, but is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government. The preamble of the Act points this out as well as the fact that the CP constitutes a clear, present and grave danger.

The Government in the Philippines during the past several years has had to contend with the guerilla warfare tactics of the Hukbalahaps, the military arm of the CP. It is entirely possible that these armed conflicts may have influenced that Government in determining that the CP of the Philippines presented a clear and present danger to the country and that it should be declared illegal.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. This is submitted for your information. It is not believed that the Bureau should take any action or submit any recommendations to the Department based upon a review of the Anti Subversion Act recently passed by the Republic of the Philippines other than furnishing a Photostat to the Department for information.

2. That the attached letter be sent to the Department enclosing one Photostat of this Act for information.

RDS/
He   ✓  

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-02-2013
F63M92K22

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 6/28/57

FROM: Legat, Tokyo, Japan (66-27)

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

SUBJECT: ~~INVESTIGATIONS AT MANILA, P.I.~~

O.C.P. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Attached is an article from the "Philippine Herald,"
Manila, P.I., dated 6/20/57, which the Bureau may find to be
of interest.

Enclosure (1) ENCLOSURE

EX-131

AJN:cs
(3)

*This was analyzed
by memo 6/25/57
re "outlawing the
Communist Party in
the Philippine Islands"
signed by RDS: pvt*

RECORDED - 80
INDEXED - 80

EX-131

17 JUL 11 1957

52 JUL 16 1957

64-200-239-301

over
Brady

Anti-Red Bill Signed Into Law

**Garcia Reaffirms Gov't
Position On Communism;
Stiff Punishment Set**

President Garcia dealt a major blow against communism here yesterday when he signed House Bill No. 6584 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines. (Photo on Page 14)

The new law was signed at ceremonies in Malacañang, attended by congressmen, senators, cabinet members, members of the diplomatic corps headed by Papal Nuncio Egidio Vagnozzi, defense and armed forces officials led by Secretary of Defense Eulogio Balao and Lieut. Gen. Alfonso Arellano and various civic organizations identified against communism. The solons were headed by the two main sponsors of the bill, Representative Joaquin Rocas and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez.

In a prepared statement, the President said that the new statute, otherwise known as the anti-subversion act, "reaffirms the position which our government has taken, and will take, vis-a-vis communism: a firm, unequivocal, and uncompromising stand against freedom's most odious and implacable foe."

With the approval of the law, he stated, "our people have not only officially made the fight against communism a matter of national policy but we have also acquired a potent weapon in the fight against subversion."

In this "vigorous and reasoned counter-offensive to Communist aggression, I feel that we are serving the cause of the Free World as well as our own best interests."

The President credited the champions of civil rights in congress who made the necessary safeguards to maintain inviolate the legitimate exercise by citizens of their rights. "What the present law punishes is not dissent or heresy but subversion and conspiracy," he stressed.

Chief Executive Garcia gave strong assurance that the anti-subversion act would not only see to it that the anti-communist program of my illustrious predecessor, Ramon Magsaysay, will remain intact, but I shall also push it through with the same dedication and with unrelenting vigor."

The anti-subversion act declares the Communist Party of the Philippines as an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government for the purpose of setting up a totalitarian regime. (Continued on page 2 col. 5)

The act provides that whoever knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the Communist party, shall be meted the penalty of *arresto mayor* and shall be disqualified permanently from holding public office, and from exercising the right to vote.

The principal penalty for a second conviction shall be *prision correccional*, and in all subsequent convictions the penalty of *prision mayor* shall be imposed; and any alien convicted shall be deported immediately after serving his sentence.

Should such member be an officer or a ranking leader of the outlawed party, or should he take up arms against the government, he shall be punished by *prision mayor* to death with all the necessary penalties provided for such acts in the revised penal code.

The act further provides that one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the government by force, violence, deceit, subversion or other illegal means, for the purpose of placing such government or political subdivision under the control and domination of any alien power, shall be punished by *prision correccional* to *prision mayor* with all the accessory penalties provided for such act.

The President signed five copies of the bill. He signed the first copy with Rocas and Pelaez, other solons of both Congress; the second, with the diplomatic corps which was in full attendance; the third, with officials of the defense department and the armed forces; the fourth, with cabinet members; and the fifth, with civic organizations known for their anti-communist stand.

Among the legislators present, besides Rocas and Pelaez, were Senators Pacita M. Gonzalez and Pedro Sabido, Speaker Pro-tempore Daniel Z. Romualdez, House Majority Floor Leader Arturo M. Tolentino, Congressmen Erasmo Cruz, Celestino Juan, and Pedro Albano, Undersecretary of Defense Jose M. Crisol, and Governors Alejo Santos of Bulacan and Amado Aleta of Nueva Ecija.

The full text of President Garcia's speech follows:

"I have signed into law the bill outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines.

"With this law, our people have not only officially made the fight against communism a matter of national policy but we have also acquired a potent weapon in the fight against subversion.

"Successful as we have been in breaking the backbone of armed communist resistance, we find ourselves seriously handicapped in countering effectively the more insidious activities of communists who have ostensibly forsworn violence and sought expediently the protection of the very laws of the land which they seek to destroy.

"Thus, even with our success in the military field the congressional Committee on Anti-Filipino Activities, after conducting the most comprehensive and authoritative study ever made on the problem of communism in our country, concluded that Communism remains a real and continuing threat to the national security. It is to the credit of this Committee that the bill outlawing the Communist party was conceived and recommended. It is, likewise, to the credit of the champions of civil rights in Congress that necessary safeguards were made such that the legitimate exercise by citizens of their rights shall remain inviolate. What the present law punishes is not dissent or heresy but subversion and conspiracy.

ENCLOSURE

PHILIPPINE HERALD
MANILA, P.I.
6-20-57

64-200-239-301

Communist infiltration, and with the aid of our own experiences, establish the fact that the objectives of communism are the destruction of our social, political and economic systems and their replacement by a foreign and godless ideology guided and directed from abroad. These same sources, as well as our experience, establish the Communist means of achieving these objectives as including armed force, sabotage, espionage and the many sinister forms of subversion. Far from contenting itself with seeking victory, as do other political minorities, by legal democratic process, Communist doctrine flatly denies the possibility of legal success and prescribes criminal conspiracy as its orthodox tactic.

"Under the circumstances it is clearly the right and the duty of this Government to invoke the police powers of a sovereign state to protect itself and the institutions entrusted to its care from criminal attack.

"The passage of this law reaffirms the position which our government has taken, and will take, vis-a-vis communism: a firm, unequivocal, and uncompromising stand against freedom's most odious and implacable foe.

"In this vigorous and reasoned counter-offensive to Communist aggression, I feel that we are serving the cause of the Free World as well as our own best interests. If our neighbors can derive benefit or guidance from our experiences and approach, we will have made a substantial contribution to the peace and security of this area.

"I assure lovers of freedom and democracy's friends everywhere that during my incumbency as President of the Republic of the Philippines I shall not only see to it that the anti-communist program of my illustrious predecessor, Ramon Magsaysay, will remain intact, but I shall also push it through with the same dedication and with unrelenting vigor."

Bill Outlawing Red Party Here Signed Into Law



THE GOVERNMENT adopted a stronger stand against communism when President Garcia signed into law House Bill 6584, outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines. Photo shows the Chief Executive signing the new statute, while looking on are Senators Emmanuel Pelaez, Pacita Madrigal Gonzalez and Pedro Sa-

bido, House Majority Floor Leader Arturo M. Tolentino, Speaker Pro Tempore Daniel Z. Romualdez, Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon, Governors Amado Aleta of Nueva Ecija and Alejo Santos of Bulacan and Legislative Secretary Jose C. Nable.

Communist Party - Philippine Islands

CONFIDENTIAL

64
61 JUL 16 1957

INDEXED - 34

NOT RECORDED
18 JUL 12 1957

239-302

Daily Intelligence Briefing
Dept. of The Army
20 June 1957
No. 2, 113

filed *gh*

MR. Tolson _____
MR. Nichols _____
MR. Boardman _____
MR. Belmont _____
MR. Mohr _____
MR. Parsons _____
MR. Rosen _____
MR. Tamm _____
MR. Trotter _____
MR. Nease _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/10/57

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (66-27)

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIERSUBJECT: ~~PHILIPPINE ANTI-SUBVERSIVE ACT~~

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

On 6/19/57 the "Philippine Anti-Subversive Act" was signed by President CARLOS GARCIA and became law in the Philippines.

For the information of the Bureau, punitive provisions in the act, as set forth in an editorial titled, "A Matter Of National Policy," in "The Philippines Herald," Manila, P.I., June 22, 1957, are:

(Probably) Felony Arrest

"SEC. 4. After the approval of this Act, whoever knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the C.P.P. and/or its successor or of any subversive association ... shall be punished by the penalty of arresto mayor and shall be disqualified permanently from holding any public office, appointive and elective, and from exercising the right to vote; in case of a second conviction, the principal penalty shall be prision correccional, and in all subsequent convictions under this Act, shall be deported immediately after he shall have served the sentence imposed upon him;

(Probably) Correctional Institution

"Provided, That if such member is an officer or a ranking leader of the C.P.P. or of any subversive association ... or if such member takes up arms against the Government, he shall be punished by prision mayor to death with all the necessary penalties provided therefor in the Revised Penal Code;

(Probably) Penitentiary

"And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the government of any of its political subdivisions, by force, violence, deceit, subversion or other illegal means, for the purpose of placing such Government or political subdivision under the control and domination of any alien power, shall be punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the same Code."

RECORDED - 73

INDEXED - 73

JUL 23 1957

HLC:jar
(3)

64 JUL 30 1957

Re: PHILIPPINE ANTI-SUBVERSIVE ACT

Safeguards provided in the act, as summarized in the same editorial, are:

"1. No prosecution under the Act shall be made unless the city or provincial fiscal, or any special attorney or prosecutor duly designated, finds after due investigation that a prima facie case for violation of any of its provisions exists against the accused; moreover, that the preliminary investigation of any offense defined and penalized under the Act by prision mayor shall be conducted by the proper Court of First Instance.

"2. Any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any action brought under the Act shall be punished by prision correccional.

"3. No person shall be convicted of any of the offenses penalized under the Act with prision mayor to death, unless on the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession of the accused in open court.

"As a final touch of grace, the law gives all those who are now connected in any manner or form to the C.P.P. or to any such subversive organization, 30 days after approval of the act to renounce their membership 'in writing or under oath before a municipal or city mayor, a provincial governor, or a person authorized by law to administer oaths,' and thereby gain exemption from liability for criminal acts or for any violation of the existing laws of the country committed before the law took effect."

64-200-239-306, 307

CHANGED TO

100-40-239-9X9, 9X12

DEC 1- 1958

ph

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

STANDARD FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

DATE 04-02-2013

F63M92K22

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: November 6, 1957

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

~~SECRET~~ AIR COURIER

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES, 751 412 10 5
IS - PHILIPPINES

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a memorandum regarding the captioned matter, which is being furnished for information purposes.

Enclosures (5)

RGK:yw

(3)

RECORDED - 61

NOV 13 1957

NOV 19 1957

ESP. SEC.

64-200-239-309
CHANGED TO
100-40-239-9X13

DEC 1-1958

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64-200-239- (311)
CHANGED TO
100-40-239- (9X15)

DEC 1-1958

ph

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 12/13/57

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES

Rememo 11/6/57.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a memorandum regarding the captioned matter, which is furnished for information purposes.

Enclosures (1)

RGK:vw

(3)

RECORDED - 60

INDEXED - 60

11 DEC 26 1957

ESP. SEC.

5- ENCLOSURE 60

52 JAN 1958

1958

64-200-239-313

CHANGED TO

100-40-239-9X17

DEC 1 - 1958

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Office

• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 1/24/58

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES

Remymemo 12/13/57.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a
letterhead memorandum regarding the captioned matter,
which is furnished for information purposes.

Enclosures (5)
HLC:vw
(3)

ENCLOSURE
31

RECORDED - 31

24 FEB 5 1958

INDEXED - 31

EST. SEC.

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10
68 FEB 11 1958

64-200-239-315
CHANGED TO
100-40-239-9X21

DEC 1-1958

ph

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 3/18/58

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES

Remymemo 1/24/58.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a
letterhead memorandum regarding the captioned matter which
is furnished for information purposes.

Enclosures (5)
RGK/mer
(3)

5 ENCLOSURE

REC-72

EX-117

24 MAR 27 1958

NAT. INT. SEC.

64 APR 9 1958

64-200-239-318
CHANGED TO

100-40-239-9X22

DEC 1-1958

ph

DIRECTOR, FBI

4/4/58

SAC, PHILADELPHIA (66-2164)

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES ABROAD
IS - CHINESE

ATTN: FBI LABORATORY

Rebulet 12/10/56, transmitting photostats of seven booklets in Chinese to this office for processing.

Enclosed herewith are two copies of the full translation of the second of the seven booklets entitled, "THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES." Translations of the first booklet were submitted by Philadelphia letter, 3/31/58. Translations of the remaining booklets will be forwarded as they are completed.

Phonetic romanizations of the names of individuals and places contained in this booklet, in instances where the correct English names were in doubt, were furnished in the Mandarin dialect, inasmuch as it is fairly certain that this dialect was employed in the original phonetic transliteration of the Philippine names into Chinese characters.

Two copies of the translation of this booklet are being furnished San Francisco, to which office all seven booklets will be returned when translation is completed.

- 2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)(RM)
- 1 - San Francisco (105-4807)(Encls. 2)(RM)
- 1 - Philadelphia (66-2164)

RY:ARD
(4)

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
16 APR 28 1958

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

5 7 APR 29 1958

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

TRANSLATION FROM THE CHINESE

Pamphlet entitled "THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES."

Issue No. 25, published August 6, 45th Year of the Republic (1956), by Department 6, Central Committee, Kuo Min Tang of China.

Table of Contents

1. Preface.
2. The Growth and Activities of The Communist Party of the Philippines.
3. The Organization and Revolt of The Communist Party of the Philippines.
4. Liquidation and Extermination by the Philippine Government and The Future Inclinations of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

ENCLOSURE

64-3000-21-✓

A STUDY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Chapter 1. Preface.

The Republic of the Philippines consists of 7084 large and small islands (eleven large islands) with a total area of 297,917 square kilometers, and a present population of 22 million people, most of which are of the Malay race, and among which is a large mixed-blood group of the Chinese, Spanish, and aborigines. Throughout the entire area, there are approximately 200,000 overseas Chinese people. Up to the present time, 4,642 of the more than seven thousand islands in the nation are still un-named and only 1990 or more islands are inhabited.

Philippine industry is not yet very prosperous with approximately 600,000 people engaged in industry, and it is a country comparatively rich in agricultural production. Although there are only 3,950,000 square ch'ing (each ch'ing equals 15.13 acres) of farm land, equivalent to 13.2 per cent of the total land area, there are over 8,466,000 people engaged in agriculture, occupying 38.5 per cent of the total population. The farming land is concentrated in the central plains, the Caga (?) plains, and PA-WAI-I (Ph.) plains of Luzon Island, and the KO-MIN-PA-TE plain of Mindanao Island. Its chief agricultural products are rice, maize, potatoes, hemp, tobacco and sugar. Its output of desiccated coconut equals one-third of the entire world's production and its exports are made chiefly to the United States. This country belonged to Indo-Malay (?) in the 13th Century, and was first discovered by Portugal in 1521. It became a colony of the Spanish Empire in 1571, and was ceded to the United States on April 1, 1899 in accordance with the terms of the Spanish-American Peace Treaty. After thirty-six years of rule under the United States, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was established in accordance with the "TYDINGS-McDUFFIE Act" on September 17, 1935, granting self-government to the Philippine people and complete independence after a period of ten years.

The interim president of the self-ruling government was the Philippine Nationalist leader, QUEZON, and OSMEÑA became the vice-president. Domestic government was administered by the Philippine people themselves while authority in foreign relations, military affairs, and customs was retained by the United States. War broke out in the Pacific in 1941,

and the autonomous government was removed to the United States when the Japanese Army occupied the Philippine Islands on January 2, 1942. On October 20, 1944, the Allied Army, under the command of General MacARTHUR, regained possession of the Philippine Islands. President QUEZON died in the United States at that time, and Vice-President OSMEÑA returned to become president until his term expired with the general election in 1946, in which ROXAS, who had occupied an important post in the puppet government of President LO-LAI-ERH (Ph.) during the period of Japanese occupancy, was elected president, and QUIRINO elected vice-president. On July 4th of that year, the Philippines formally became an independent nation, but unfortunately, armed rebellion by the Communist Party began a year later.

The reason why the Communist Party actively engaged in seditious activities and spared no efforts in their armed rebellion in the Philippines was because of the strategically important position of this nation. According to its position, the Philippines is only separated from our country of Formosa by the Bashi Channel, looks out over the islands of the Pacific Ocean on the east, stands directly opposite the Indonesian Island of Celebes in the south, separated from British and Netherlands Borneo by the Sulu Sea on the west, and maintains scheduled communications connections with Hong Kong and Vietnam in the northwest, so that looking at its military strategic position, it is the most strategic outpost in Southeast Asia, and a central base for naval and aerial warfare in the West Pacific Ocean. Control of the Philippines means control of the Western Pacific within shouting distance of the mainland of our country. These are the reasons for the active movements of the Communist Party in the Philippines. With these things in mind, representatives of the democratic nations of Australia, New Zealand, the United States, England, France, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan concluded the "Southeast Asia Treaty" in Manila on September 8, 1954, with the hope of uniting to prevent armed aggression by the Communist Party.

Chapter 2. The Growth and Activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

As early as 1925, the Communist International had sent TAN MALAKA, a member of the Indonesian Communist Party, to the Philippines to engage in Communist activities, and in 1927, two years later, the

preparatory work for the organization of the Philippine Communist Party had been roughly completed. In this same year, the Soviet Communist Party also sent a Chinese Communist spy, YANG Ch'ing-tung (M) YEUNG Hing-tung (C) 2799/1987/2639, from Shanghai to Manila to "understand conditions," and after living there for a few weeks, he went to Moscow to study Communism and how to introduce Communism to the East. When YANG Ch'ing-tung went to Russia, he was accompanied by four Philippine labor leaders who returned to the Philippines two years later in 1930. On November 7th of that year — Commemoration Day for the October Revolution in Russia and also the National Holiday of Soviet Russia, the Communist Party of the Philippines was formally established and liaison was obtained with the Communist International.

YANG Ch'ing-tung studied in Russia for five years, after which he travelled back and forth frequently between the mainland of our country, the Philippines and Soviet Russia, engaging in activities for the Philippine Communist Party. After the Chinese Communists seized and occupied the mainland, YANG returned to Shanghai to take a position as a political committee member of the puppet Overseas Chinese Committee. During YANG's activities in the Philippines, his influential party partners were three Chinese persons, namely WENG Chieh (M) YUNG Kit (C) 5040/0267, LI Ying-hao (M) LEE Ying-ho (C) 2621/5391/6275, and HSU Chih-pei (M) HUEI Chi-pak (C) 6079/1807/0554. WENG held tremendous authority in the Military Affairs Department of the Philippine Communist Party, and in the summer of 1942, was entrusted with the mission of reorganizing the Philippine Communist Party into a well-disciplined party organization with the help of LI. During 1946 and 1947, the both of them stole back to the Chinese mainland because they feared apprehension by the government. HSU Chih-pei assumed the responsibility of arranging for activity expenses for the Philippine Communist Party. At one time, WENG purchased weapons for the Philippine Communists and solicited donations amounting to several hundreds of thousands of dollars in U. S. currency, and also took charge of enticing and forcing the overseas Chinese residing in the Philippines to return to the mainland of our country to receive training in Chinese Communist espionage organizations. HSU was apprehended by the Philippine Government in 1941 and was reported to have been extradited to Formosa for punishment. It can be seen from this that the growth of the Philippine Communist Party was actually nourished by the Chinese Communist Party entrusted with this mission by the Communist International.

Besides receiving the help of the Chinese Communists, the growth of the Philippine Communist Party also received a certain amount of assistance from the Communist Party of the United States, which smuggled

many things into the Philippine Communists, including money, propaganda information, nonstrategic materials such as typewriters and mimeograph machines, and financial resources, and five or six American soldiers also joined in the rebellious forces of the Communist Party. Among these was PANG-YU-IO-I (Ph.), who had joined the Communist Party of the U.S.A. as a member in 1938, and who accompanied the U.S. 5th Air Force Squadron to the Philippines in 1944. He returned to the United States in 1946, resigned from his position, and returned to the Philippines where he married a Philippine girl at the University of Philippines, and upon his graduation from this university, he went into the mountains to join the organized activities of the Philippine Communist Party, assuming duties in the work of planning political strategy and cultural education.

In the first ten years after the Philippine Communist Party was formally established in 1930, there were very few party members. Besides, the United States had already indicated its decision to relinquish its policy of colonization, thus giving the Philippine Communist Party no excuse for any serious development or activities. The Philippine Communist Party membership increased in 1940 and it proceeded with appeals for "land reform system," and in the provinces of Pampanga, I-HSI-HSIA (Ph.), WU-LAI-KAN (Ph.) and TAN-LU (Ph.) in central Luzon, and CHI-SHUN (Ph.) and MEI-HU (Ph.) in southern Luzon, they encouraged the peasants to engage in class struggles against the landlords and create disorder which resulted in many bloody incidents. Certain results were obtained in this struggle and it formed a foundation for the Philippine Communist Party in its future revolts.

After the Japanese Army occupied the Philippines in 1941, the Philippine Government carried on its work underground and launched its guerrilla warfare. The Philippine Communist Party also used the excuse of resisting Japan to unite the Socialist Party, the People's Freedom Alliance, labor, youth and religious organizations, to form the "Loyalty Front," and under the banner of "National Liberation," proceeded with its struggle against the Japanese. However, the "Loyalty Front" was no sooner established when it became dissolved because of internal dissension resulting from the Philippine Communist Party's impatient control and management. On March 29, 1942, the Philippine Communist Party again united the Socialist Party, peasant associations and labor alliances to re-establish the "United Front," and the Philippines organized the "People's Army of Resistance to Japan" in the Arayat (?) Forest of Central Luzon, with a Joint Military Affairs Committee, consisting of members from all organizations participating in the front, as the highest military command, and with the Philippine Communist leaders, TARUC and AH-LI-HAN-JEN (Ph.) serving as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, wielding dictatorial military authority. Most of the members of the "People's Army of Resistance to Japan"

were from the Huk tribe of people, hence, as a matter of habit, it was also called the "Huk Army," and also gave the Philippine Communist Party the name of the "Huk (Hu) Party." (Some people also translated it as the "Hu Huk Party.")

When the "People's Army of Resistance to Japan" was first established, the Philippine Communists claimed that it had 13,000 persons, its principal regions of activities were in the provinces of Pampanga, NU-LAI-KAN (Ph.), I-HSI-HSIA (Ph.), and TAN-LU (Ph.), where the Philippine Communist Party had its beginning. Later on they gradually spread out from the forests and mountains to the plains, and everywhere they went, they confiscated land, armed the peasants, enforced rent reduction in places where land was centralized and where there were only a small number of landlords, so that they could entice and intimidate the peasants, and in certain comparatively secure bases, they also established "Village Assemblies" and "Democratic Governments." At that time, it was impossible for the Japanese Army to control the entire area, and the Communist Army was able to increase in strength rapidly. When the Japanese surrendered, the Communist Party claimed that it had a regular army of 30,000 persons, a reserve force of 50,000 persons, and that it controlled an area of twenty-seven towns and villages. Naturally, these figures are not entirely accurate, and others have stated that the regular army consisted of only 20,000 persons or so, but it is a fact that the Philippine Communist Party has been rather active during these three years.

In October 1944, the U. S. Army counter-attacked and landed in the Philippines, and in February, the following year, chased the Japanese Army off the islands. The United States faithfully kept its pre-war promise to grant complete independence to the Philippines, and on July 4, 1946, a free and independent Republic of the Philippines was officially born.

During the period of the U. S. Army counter-attack against the Japanese Army right up to the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines, the Philippine Communists took advantage of all opportunities to plague the U. S. - Philippine Army with raids and widespread destruction. They set up puppet regimes in various places, plotting to seize political power in one uprising during the exhilarating period of the war and confused post-war conditions. Thereafter, the Communist Parties on the mainland of our country, in Vietnam, Malaya, and Burma, etc., were in complete unison in adopting the guerilla warfare tactics and strategies

used during the period of the war against Japan. Fortunately, the timely preventive measures of the U. S. Military Authorities prevented the realization of their plans. In January 1945, the Headquarters of the U. S. Army issued the command to disarm the "People's Resistance Army" and to dissolve the illegal regimes of the Philippine Communists, arrested TARUC, Commander-in-Chief of the "People's Resistance Army," and other top-level personnel, and also arrested the Communist Party Governor of Pampanga Province, AN-LI-HAN-JEN (Ph.), together with more than sixty other persons. However, one section of the "People's Resistance Army" forces had secretly retreated into the mountain regions. It was not long after that TARUC and the others were released, and escaping back to the mountains, they organized the remnant forces and renewed plans for revolt. In August 1946, the open armed revolt of the Philippine Communist Party was begun, and to this day, it has not stopped.

Chapter 3. The Organization and Revolt of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

The power of the Philippine Communist Party was not at all great in the two years prior to its revolt. In their political struggles, they initiated the establishment of the so-called "National Democratic United Front," and established the "Democratic Alliance." Actually, however, only two organizations made up the "alliance," namely the "Philippine Workers' Organization Convention" and the "National Peasants Alliance," and the organized membership of these two organizations, according to Communist announcements at that time, consisted of approximately 100,000 members in the former and approximately 300,000 members in the latter. In the military, Philippine Communist guerilla activities were limited to the mountainous regions and unable to spread out because of the attacks by Government forces to exterminate them; besides, their existence was in dire peril.

After the death of Philippine President ROXAS in June 1948, and his succession by QUSONO, the Philippine Communist Party saw that they were certain to be exterminated completely if they were to continue their bitter fight under the fierce attacks by government forces, so they followed the so-called "Strategy of Retreat" handed down by LENIN and studied the "peaceful negotiations" experiences of the Chinese Communists and Vietnam Communist Party, and under the camouflage of peace, appealed to the government to grant amnesty to all political criminals and to enforce land reform, in exchange for which, they were willing to surrender their arms and pledge their allegiance. TARUC went to Manila personally

to negotiate with the Philippine Government, and this was exactly the same "Revolutionary strategy" as that used by MAO Tse-tung when he personally went to Chungking for a conference, and by HU Chih-ming when he personally travelled to Paris for a conference. Although there were no successful results in the negotiations, the Philippine Communist Party did attain the status of a legal political party, gain a period of peace and rest, and slacken the morale of the attacking forces of the government. Accordingly, in 1948, the year in which the Chinese Communists on the mainland were winning their so-called "basic revolutionary victories," the Communists throughout the entire world were all aware of the fact that the Chinese Communists in Cheng Kang Mountain, armed with only a few broken rifles, had actually "battled down the mountains and crossed the rivers;" so how could it help but encourage them to grip their rifles tightly and resist to the very end, and how could they voluntarily give up their weapons? Unfortunately, the Philippine Government failed to understand the Communist Party deception and negotiated with them so that they lost the one opportunity to annihilate them completely.

When the negotiations broke up, TARIU stole back to the mountains, but at this time, his remnant forces had become reorganized, and beginning in August of the same year, he became very arrogant and ordered his forces to go out in all directions to create disorder. In November, 1949, the peasants in Batuan suddenly rose up in revolt, and the Philippine Communist Party took advantage of the opportunity to take in many of the rioting peasants to swell its own armed forces. Incidents of revolt broke out at the same time among the Moslem adherents on Sulu Island, and the government forces were so busy trying to suppress the uprising of the Moslems on the one hand that they relaxed in their military efforts to exterminate the Communists on the other, thereby giving the Philippine Communists tremendous encouragement to increase their activities. Besides, the Chinese Communists held the "Asia-Australia Labor Union Convention" in Peiping in December of this year, and at this convention, the Chinese Communists received the command from Moscow to plan the united strategies for the activities of the Communist Parties in the East. In participating in this convention, the Philippine Communist Party naturally brought back a complete copy of these strategy plans, and at the same time, also received assurances of financial and material assistance, so that after 1950, the Philippine Communist Party became even more arrogant and disorderly.

The so-called united strategy plans for Communist Party activities in the East were actually the widespread enforcement of the "MAO Tse-tung Line." These facts were discovered from certain

confidential documents of the Communist Party which were seized in the case in October, 1950, when the Philippine Government raided the Philippine Communist Party Central Politburo organization and arrested twenty-nine important Philippine Communist figures including MAI-KO-LUN AI-SZU-PI-LI (Ph.).

(1) In the document "Twenty Years of Struggle Of The Philippine Communist Party," it was stated: "The economic oppression of the Philippines by imperialism and the deceptive and terroristic policies used in the elections by the Philippine Government in 1949, had already brought into existence the present revolutionary conditions, and the Philippine Communist Party has made a special public appeal to the people throughout the entire nation to rise and overthrow the quisling of U. S. imperialism — the Government of the Liberal Party."

(2) In the document "Military Tactics and Military Strategy," it was stated: "The Philippine Communist Party announces that the circumstances of revolution already exist in the Philippines and that it is concentrating all its efforts in accelerating the maturity of these revolutionary circumstances, so that the quisling government of imperialism can be overthrown and a new democratic regime can be established."

(3) In a proclamation issued by the Central Committee of the Philippine Communist Party on August 26, 1950, it was pointed out even more clearly that: "What should be our attitude towards these new circumstances which have developed (referring to the aforementioned circumstances)? We must hasten the collapse of the QUIRINO Government, and adopt methods of propaganda or mass movements (armed or unarmed) to prove that the present government cannot resolve many problems of the people. The only resolution at present is the armed liberation of the entire nation and the establishment of a new democratic regime. We must expose as much as possible the weaknesses of Christianity, the Socialist Party, the Third Force, and all smaller bourgeois reformists, resolutely expand and develop the organization and armed power of our entire nation, and on the other hand, create as much contradiction as possible among the present leading classes."

(4) The document "Exterminate imperialism and puppet war-mongers" stated: "The People's Liberation Army of the Philippines, under the leadership of the Communist Party, has already opened a road

for us. The Philippine Communist Party appeals to the people throughout the entire nation to quickly organize all types of guerilla organizations to cooperate with it and struggle resolutely for the final armed extermination of imperialism and the puppet war-mongers."

(5) The document "Establish an underground government to overthrow the imperialist puppet regime" listed quite clearly the ten main principles in the activities of the Philippine Communist Party and its appeal to the people for cooperation. The ten principles are:

1. "Arm yourselves to protect your lives, freedom and property."
2. "Equal distribution of the harvests of the peasants and the friendly and good landlords; confiscation of the harvests and property assets of hostile landlords and other enemies; maintain the lowest living wages for workers in the industries of friendly and good capitalists; seize all enterprises of imperialists and hostile capitalists."
3. "Delay payments of taxes to the puppet government, and advise all your neighbors to do the same."
4. "Refuse to sell your harvest to the enemy."
5. "Establish local underground governments, and devise methods of infiltrating puppet government organs for the convenience of the business of armed liberation."
6. "Cooperate with the Liberation Army units and Communist Party organizations in all places in the establishment of schools for the people for the purpose of training local work officials."
7. "Establish People's Courts in all places."
8. "Seek and collect all intelligence and statistic information concerning the enemy and report it to local Liberation Army units or Communist Party organs."

9. "Maintain close liaison with local Liberation Army units and Communist Party organs, and furnish officials of the Liberation Army and Communist Party with food, lodging, and transportation, so that they may be able to execute their duties."

10. "Apprehend all leaders of yellow labor unions; liquidate all reactionary landlords, Philippine spies, secret police, and all those people who are unwilling to reform their anti-socialist and disloyal conduct."

(6) One document entitled "Infiltration Military Tactics" advocated that members of the Philippine Communist Party should infiltrate the Philippine Government, armed forces and anti-Communist organizations as much as possible to engage in underground work for the "Liberation Army" and the Communist Party. This advocacy was based upon the decision passed by the Central Committee Secretariat of the Philippine Communist Party on September 15, 1950, which instructed party followers to encourage and incite the workers and peasants to engage in economic struggles to make the masses of people understand that the present government cannot satisfy their demands so that they will transfer their support to the "People's Liberation Movement," and to make the workers and peasants realize that the only way to improve their destiny is in armed struggle."

Although we cannot fully understand the activity platform of the Philippine Communist Party in its present stage from the foregoing documents, we are able to see the following important points in its political advocations and line of strategy:

(1) Include the Philippine Communist movements within the sphere of the Eastern Section "National Liberation Movements," and in accordance with the decision of the "Asia-Australia Labor Union Convention," designate armed struggle as the principal form of struggle for the Philippine Communist Party, with the method for armed struggle to follow the line of prolonged revolt of the villages surrounding the cities.

(2) Organize the United Front, support the armed struggle. The sphere of the united front will use the labor-peasant alliance as its foundation, unite the smaller bourgeois and the nationalist

bourgeois to form a widespread united front.

(3) Expand the underground struggle and mass movements, engage in battle through a second front in government districts. Besides the previously mentioned ten principles in the activity platform, the methods for second front warfare also included assassination, arson, armed robbery, and creation of terrorism and fear in the government districts.

Comprehensively surveying all the points mentioned above, the Philippine Communist Party, beginning in 1950, had a comparatively complete set of "revolution" strategy line and method for struggle, and they have followed these methods in their revolts during the past six years. This tallies exactly with the "People's Democracy" line of strategy of the Communist International and the so-called "MAO Tse-tung Road."

In April, 1950, the Philippine Communist Party officially announced the change of the name "People's Resistance Army" to "The People's Liberation Army of the Philippines" (Actually this name had already been in use as far back as 1947, but was not announced at the time.), dissolved the original Military Affairs Committee and established a Military Affairs Committee under the "Central Secretariat," placing the army under the leadership of the party, divided the Philippines into nine military districts, established nine "military headquarters" and one "municipal military district to handle separately the government, economic and military work in each district. The following is its district divisions:

- (1) First Military District:-
HSEH-AH-SI-KA (Ph.), PENG-KA-SIN-NAN (ph.),
Provinces at foot of mountains.
- (2) Second Military District:-
Pampanga, Tarlac, SEN-PA-ENH (Ph.),
Bataan.
- (3) Third Military District:- Bulacan, Rizal (Cities of Rizal
belong to the "City Committee").
- (4) Fourth Military District:-
Laguna, Batangas, Quezon, Cavite.
- (5) Fifth Military District:-
North KA-MA-LIN (Ph.),
South KA-MA-LIN (Ph.), AH-PEI-ENH (Ph.),
SU-SU-KENG (Ph.).

- (6) Sixth Military District:-
Panay, Negros, Cebu, Samar, Leyte,
Bahol, Palawan.
- (7) Seventh Military District:-
Davao, Linao, Cotabato, Zamboanga,
Agusan (?).
- (8) Eighth Military District:-
All Provinces in the Cagayan River Basin,
HSIN-WEI-TZU-KA-YA (ph.).
- (9) Ninth Military District:-
North I-WEI-KO (Ph.), South I-WEI-KO (Ph.),
Abra (?), United Provinces.
- (10) City (Municipal) Military District:-
Manila, MA-LA-MING (Ph.),
Caloocan, Navotas, New San Francisco,
Quezon City, MENG-TA-LU-YING (Ph.),
San Juan, Makati, Pasay, Pasig,
KUA-TA-LO-PI (Ph.), PA-KO-LA-LUM (Ph.),
Paranaque, Muntinlupa, Alabang.

The military district divisions may have covered all of the Philippines, but the principal bases of military activities were in the province of PA-TA-YEN (Ph.) of the Bataan Peninsula in central Luzon, the Sierra Madre Mountain region and Kao-Shan Province in northern Luzon; and the provinces of Mei-Hu and Quezon in southern Luzon; guerilla bases were also established on the other islands of Mindanao, Palawan, Panay, Tien-I-Tai (Ph.), Su-Mu (Ph.) and Mindoro to create disturbances. There were Philippine Communist activities in all major cities in the Philippines, and also small groups of armed party followers engaging in the work of assassination, arson, and destruction, so that the reputation of the Philippine Communist Party held the islands in the grip of terror. In March, 1950, the Philippine Communist Army attacked and occupied many important towns and municipalities in the province of Pampanga, and in July, the war spread to nineteen provincial municipalities in Luzon Island; Santa

Cruz, the capital city of Nei-Hu Province once fell before the attack; Clark Airfield was attacked; disturbances were created in Pi-Yao, and many of the high-level personnel in the Philippine Government were killed by the Communist Party. During this one year, the Philippine Communist Army launched four major offensives called "Intermittent type periodic offensives" during which great losses were suffered by the Philippine Government.

During the first half of 1951, Philippine Communist Army activities became even more widespread, extending to the islands of Mindanao, etc. Beginning in September of that year, attacks were launched in the provinces of Pampanga, Hsin-I-Hsi-Hsia (Ph.), I-Sha-Pai-Lai (Ph.), Quezon, and Wu-Ta-Kan (Ph.). In the latter part of September, they once entered Manila and engaged the military police in street warfare, from which a glance of their power of agitation could be obtained. The main purpose of the Philippine Communists in taking such positive action without regard for the consequences was to break up the Second General Election held by the Philippine Government after its independence in November, 1951, and besides creating military disturbances to disrupt the election, they also employed such terroristic tactics as burning the ballot boxes, intimidating the people to keep them from voting, kidnapping and assassinating party and political leaders to obstruct the campaign activities of the various parties. According to incomplete statistics, in the period of one week during the middle of September that year, about six leaders of various political parties were abducted, SAN-TA-YEH-NA (Ph.), Governor of Quezon Province, was also kidnapped, incidents of political assassination occurred incessantly, and tens of political party chiefs were killed. Although this general election was successfully completed due to the large military forces sent out by the government to enforce defensive measures, the government and the people had their fill of the agitation and trouble created by the Communist Army, and according to Philippine Communist propaganda, during their most thriving period in this one year, they occupied one-third of the entire island of Luzon, some saying that they occupied one-tenth of the total territory of the Philippines, which is approximately 27,000 square miles. But following this one year period of prosperity, the Philippine Communist Party began to decline and the controlling authority of the fighting gradually transferred into the hands of the government army. At present, they face the possibility of complete annihilation.

According to information contained in documents seized by the Philippine Government in a raid on the Central Politburo of the Philippine Communist Party, it was learned that the Central Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines (abbreviated C.P.P.) at that time was as follows.

(1) "National Congress:" Organized by delegates from local party organizations, and is the central organ of highest authority of the CPP.

(2). "Central Committee:" Consists of a certain number of committee members and alternate committee members, actual number and method for election are decided by the "National Congress." In the interim that the National Congress is not in session, the "Central Committee" is the party's organ of highest authority. Its duties are: (1) Enforce the party constitution and policies decided by the National Congress; (2) promulgate rules and regulations during the period the National Congress is in adjournment; (3) manage all political and organizational work of the party; (4) appoint and dismiss all personnel of organizations under its jurisdiction; (5) manage the party's finances and submit reports of the financial condition of the party to the National Congress; (6) elect the secretary-general and members of the politburo.

(3) The "Central Politburo;" The highest organ of authority executing all the duties of the Central Committee during the period of its adjournment. Its members and alternate members are all decided by the Central Committee, the secretary-general and the politburo are responsible to the Central Committee for all their decisions and activities.

(4) "Central Secretariat:" Since the Expanded Conference of the Central Politburo of the Philippine Communist Party passed the decision in January, 1950 to abolish the "General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army," (abbreviated G.H.Q.), this office has taken over the duties of GHQ. According to: (1) the contents of a seized document "Itinerary(7) of the History of The Communist Party of the Philippines," it was stated: "In consideration of existing internal and international conditions, the Conference decided to abolish the General Headquarters of the Liberation Army and to have the Central Secretariat execute its duties temporarily." (2) "Explanation of proposals passed by the Expanded Conference of the Central Politburo" which was approved by the "Central Secretariat" on September 8, 1950, it was stated: "During the Conference of the Politburo, we temporarily

abolished the General Headquarters of the Liberation Army and delegated its duties to the Central Secretariat, and transferred the general headquarters personnel to supervise the various "military districts" to insure the effective completion of our expanded plans."

(3) "The Basic Training Of Our Military Forces" approved by the Secretariat in July 28, 1950, it was stated: "The Central Secretariat and directing personnel of the Politburo will temporarily replace the original Military Affairs Committee so that our basic military training work can be regulated."

(5) "Central Organisation Bureau:" The organ which manages all organizational and financial matters pertaining to the Philippine Communist Party. At the same time, it also manages all organizations of the peasants, working people, and youths.

(6) "Central Communications Department:" The organ which manages the party's internal communications and supplies for all military districts.

(7) "Special Warfare Department:" Originally belonged to the General Headquarters of the Liberation Army, specializing in the management of technical warfare matters against the enemy, such as, the use of bombs and land mines, etc.

(8) "Technical Department:" Specializes in the management of weapons manufacture. Two smaller groups, "Chemistry" and "Engineering," are established under this department.

(9) "Central Information Department:" Its most important duty is to search for and collect military information, with political and economic information rating second in importance. The Central Information Department has no individual secondary organs, but each military district headquarters organizes a small information squad consisting of three to five persons, from which one or two of the persons are designated to be placed under its direct command.

(10) "Central Financial Affairs Committee:" Manages all financial affairs. The decision passed by the "Central Secretariat" in March 28, 1950, stated: "Food and provisions for the members and officers of the Politburo while performing their work in local areas will be provided by military district headquarters, while other

necessities will be issued by the Central Financial Affairs Committee upon personal application and approval by the Central Secretariat. The families of work leaders in all military districts will be cared for by each individual military district. The families of work leaders outside of the military districts and in the three military districts, numbers 5, 6, and 7, will be cared for by the Central Financial Affairs Committee. The method of taking care of them will be to issue each family one sum of two to five hundred pesos to enable them to operate small businesses themselves so that they can live on the income." Also, the decision of the "Central Secretariat" on September 29, 1950, on the principle of granting approval, after due consideration, to the "Central Financial Affairs Committee" to control financial matters, stated: "Besides maintaining expenses of the Secretariat, Organization Bureau, Education Department, forces of the Liberation Army, Financial Affairs Committee, Communications Department, Information Department, Politburo, and hospitals, the remainder of the income should be allotted according to the following percentage rates: (1) twenty-five per cent for party business expansion expenses; (2) twenty per cent for ammunition and weapons; (3) fifteen per cent for propaganda and education expenses; (4) fifteen per cent for information; (5) ten per cent for communication; (6) five per cent for medicines; (7) five per cent for personal allowances; (8) five per cent for family subsidies."

(11) "Central Education Department:" Manages matters pertaining to the education of party members and propaganda.

(12) "Military Affairs Committee:" Duties already described previously.

Appendix One: Chart of the Central Organization of the Philippine Communist Party and the Top-Level Organization of its Liberation Army. (Refer to Page 16 (a).

Appendix Two: List of the twenty-nine important members of the Central Politburo of the Philippine Communist Party, their positions and the sentences passed upon them.

(1) FEDERICO R. MACLANI - member of the Philippine Communist Central Politburo.

CHART OF THE CENTRAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMUNIST PARTY
AND THE TOP LEVEL ORGANIZATION OF ITS LIBERATION ARMY.

NATIONAL CONGRESS

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

CENTRAL POLITBURO
SECRETARIAT

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (Directs General HQ of People's Liberation Army)	CENTRAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT	CENTRAL FINANCIAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE	CENTRAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT	TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT	SPECIAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT	CENTRAL COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT	CENTRAL ORGANIZATION BUREAU
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MUNICIPAL	9th	8th	7th	6th	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st
MILITARY	MILITARY	MILITARY	MILITARY	MILITARY	MILITARY	MILITARY	MILITARY	MILITARY	MILITARY
DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT

- (2) RAMON ESPIRITU - Member of Philippine Communist Central Politburo and Chairman of the Central Financial Affairs Committee.
- (3) MAGNO BUENO YPONTELLERA - Member of the Philippine Communist Central Committee, Member of the Provincial and District Committee; Chief supporter for the proposal to expand the Philippine Communist Party.
- (4) HONOFRE MANGILA - Member of the CPP Central Committee, and Chairman of the Central Organisation Bureau.
- (5) DEMINASA CALONJE - (Female) Chairman of the CPP Central Communications Department.
- (6) GENON BUNGAY Y BAGTAS - Commander of the CPP People's Liberation Army in the province of PA-TRNG-KO-SZU (Ph.).

The above six persons were sentenced to death by the Philippine Court.

- (7) JOSE LAVA - Central Secretary-General of the CPP.
- (8) FEDERICO BAUTISTA - Member of the CPP Central Financial Affairs Committee.
- (9) ANGEL BAKING - Head of the CPP Central Technical Department, and Head of the Liberation Army GNG, Special Warfare Department. On the surface, he is an employee in the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- (10) ROSARIO C. VDA. DE SANTOS - (Female) External Stations Liaison Officer in the CPP Central Communications Dept.
- (11) CESARIO TORRES - Head of the Technical Office of the CPP Central Education Department.

- (12) ARTURO BAKING Y CALMA - Assistant Chairman of the CPP Central Education Department.
- (13) MARCOS MEDINA - Commanding Officer (?) of the 29th Division of the CPP People's Liberation Army, and member of the 4th Military District Organization Committee.
- (14) SIMON GUTIERREZ Y RODRIGUEZ - Member of the CPP Central Financial Affairs Committee.
- (15) MARCIANO DE LEON Y ESPRITU - Employee in the Personnel Office of the Philippine Police Guard Department. Once furnished the CPP with important confidential documents concerning personnel matters.

The nine persons listed above were given life sentences. The eleven persons listed below were given prison sentences or placed under security.

- (16) LAMBERTO MAGBOO - Member of the CPP Communications Dept. Sentenced to a penal term of ten years.
- (17) NICANOR RAZON - Secretary and accountant in the CPP TANG-TO (Ph.) District Committee of the city of Manila. Sentenced to a penal term of ten years.
- (18) JULITA RODRIGUEZ Y GUTIERREZ - (female) Stenographer and typist in the CPP Central Organization Dept. Sentenced to ten years imprisonment.
- (19) ESTEDAN GONZALES Y LA TORRE - Member of the CPP. Sentenced to four months in prison.
- (20) ROSALINA QUEZON - (female) Communications personnel in the CPP Liberation Army. Sentenced to a penal term of ten years.
- (21) PEDROVICENCIO - CPP Communications. Sentenced to a penal term of ten years.

- (22) FELIPE ENGRESO - CPP Communications. Sentenced to four years imprisonment.
- (23) JOSEFINA ADELAN - (female) Nurse in the Liberation Army. Sentenced to four years imprisonment.
- (24) CONRADO DOMINGO - Soldier in the Liberation Army. Sentenced to four years imprisonment.
- (25) ELPIDIO ABUNO ADINE - CPP Liberation Army Communications. Not quite sixteen years of age, and was committed to the Boys' Educational Institution of the Social Welfare Department.
- (26) NATY CRUZ - (female) Communications personnel in the CPP Central Communications Department. Because she was not yet sixteen years of age, was committed to the Girls' Educational Institution of the Social Welfare Department.

The following three persons were acquitted because of lack of sufficient evidence and released.

- (27) VICTORIA RODRIGUEZ (female) Younger sister of SIMON GUTIERREZ Y RODRIGUEZ. Served as typist for her brother.
- (28) NIGANOR CAPALAN - Secretary of the "Peasant Association" in the Province of Bulacan.
- (29) AURORA GARCIA (female) - Fourteen years of age. Was employed by ROSARIO C. VDA. DE SANTOS and sold the Philippine Communist publication, "SPARKS" (Literal).

Chapter 4. Liquidation and Extermination by The Philippine Government And The Future Inclinations of The Communist Party of the Philippines.

Although the Philippine Government attacked the hideouts of the Philippine Communists frequently since they started their revolt, no results were obtained at first because of its ineffective methods, while on the other hand, the Philippine Communists became more and more violent in their activities. It was not until the Philippine Government captured twenty-nine of the most important members of the Philippine Communist Central Politburo in 1950 and seized a large number of important documents belonging to the Philippine Communist Party from which they obtained a clear understanding of the Communist Party's organization, activity strategies, movements, its complete plans to overthrow the government by force, and its actual strength, before the government could decide upon a realistic and effective plan of attack to exterminate their hideouts. For example, the estimate of the armed strength of the Philippine Communists before the capture was based only on the figures reported by the Philippine Communist Party itself, and the plans of attack were made accordingly. The Philippine Communist Party had announced that at the end of 1950, it had a regular armed force of 30,000 men and a reserve force of 250,000, totalling 280,000 altogether. In 1951, the Philippine Communist Party announced that its regular army had been increased to 110,000, while officials of the Philippine Government estimated it to be 60,000 men, but after the capture, the confirmed figures showed that there were only 10,800 men in the regular army in July 1950, and that its estimated increased personnel in September, 1951, numbered only 172,000 persons including its reserve forces. With such great discrepancies between the true and the false, the plans for attack upon the hideouts based upon such figures would undoubtedly have differed to a great extent, and from this could be seen the tremendous contribution which this capture made to the anti-Communist struggle and work of the Philippine Nation. According to a statement by Philippine President MAOSAYSAY, the documents seized during the capture filled five carloads, and included the complete membership register of the Philippine Communist Party. Later, the Philippine Government also captured PU-MA-LA (Ph.), an American member of the Communist Party in the Philippines, who stated that when TARUC heard this news over his radio receiver, he ran out from a small house and stated to PU-MA-LA (Ph.) and other Philippine Communist leaders: "We are finished, the government has seized all of our plans and membership records." Hence, this discovery actually dealt the Philippine Communist Party a fateful blow. It was also the turning point in which the Philippine Government turned defeat into victory in its work of exterminating the Communists.

It was learned from the membership records of the Philippine Communist Party that in July, 1950, there were 3600 officers

and 10,800 members in the Philippine Communist Party, a total of 14,400 persons, and it was estimated that in September, 1951, the number of officers had increased to 5600 persons and the membership to 172,000 persons, but because of the constant destruction of its organization and the setbacks it suffered in its military revolts, it not only failed to achieve its plans for expansion, but also found it impossible to preserve its original number of members. According to the estimate of the Philippine Military Authorities in June, 1951, there were only three to four thousand members remaining at that time.

After the Philippine Government obtained possession of these highly important documents, the first step taken by Philippine President MAGSAYSAY (Minister of Defense at that time) was to set up a research center in the ME-FEI (Ph.) Military Camp to study the main subject of "What kind of a disease germ would make a person become a Communist and actually leave his family and home to go into the mountains," and then decide upon a plan to exterminate the Communist hideouts according to the results of this study and to actual conditions. After three to four months of study, the Philippine Government recognized that the "disease germ" which converted a person into the Communist Party was: lack of food and provisions, no rice to fill his hunger, poor political administration, and oppression by the landlords. It also learned that the rebels hiding in the mountains were not all members of the Communist Party, but that seventy-five per cent were blind followers. The Communist Party promises them many things, one of which was that they would all get a piece of free land after the "revolution." This was actually an effective method of Communist propaganda.

Based upon the aforementioned results of its study, the Philippine Government adopted a policy of placing equal emphasis upon the military and political administration in its extermination of the Communist Party, and decided upon what was called the "Attack method of applying both mercy and sternness equally" (free translation), which was the method of applying both extermination and care at the same time. For extermination, force was used to kill or capture all diehard elements of the Communist Party and to use various methods of psychological warfare in coordination with military movements to urge them to surrender to the government. After August, 1951, government forces intensified its attacks upon the nests of the Communists, first of

all, attacking and breaking up the main force of the Philippine Communist Second Military District in Central Luzon; and in making a clean sweep over the old established nests in Central Luzon the following year, the Government Army sent out a force of 25,000 men and launched a combined land and air attack upon the central bases of the Philippine Communists in the forest regions, pounded down upon the General Headquarters of the Communist Army on the east coast of Luzon on April 12, and captured alive the Philippine Communist Minister of Education and Propaganda, PO-ME-LU-AI (Ph.). Following up their victory and continuing with the extermination, they captured other important Communist Party persons, and obtained victory in every major and minor battle in which they engaged, reducing the effective armed force of the Philippine Communists from several tens of thousands of people to a mere seven or eight thousand. These seven or eight thousand people were also chased into the mountains and forests, not daring to operate in the cities any longer, and with the constant searches in the mountains conducted by government forces these past few years, all that remains now is three to four thousand people, who have all been reduced to nothing in their last-ditch struggles to flee. Philippine President MAGSAYSAY once reminisced that: "When I was first appointed Minister of Defense, the Government Army was afraid to go into the deep forests to fight the Huk Party. They were only willing to go as far as the foot of the mountains or to be stationed in the cities. During this period, the Huk Party was all over the place. They went into the cities in search of food and provisions, and when they met no interference, they even went into the theaters and Y houses for recreation. Not only were nine of the fourteen municipalities in my province controlled by the Huk Party, but no public assemblies could be held in these municipalities without the permission of the commanding officers of the Huk Party, and those people who had family property or wealth all moved out of the villages because they were afraid of the Huk Party. Even the road from Manila to PI-YAO (Ph.) (a distance of 150 miles) could not be travelled after five o'clock each day because the area on all four sides of the city was under the control of the Communist Party." Today, the situation is entirely different so that the people have been referring to MAGSAYSAY as "an eminently great man of the Philippines," who courageously chased the "Huk Army" from the gates of Manila, forced them to retreat back to the mountains, and who preserved a democratic political administration and free livelihood for the Philippine people. In providing care for the Communist Party members who surrendered, they were furnished with the necessities of life such as land and homes, etc., so that they would appeal to those Communist Party members who had not yet surrendered to come forth and pledge their allegiance. The plan of operation

was to organize a "Economic Development Company," select certain regions on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, and have certain numbers of army engineers sent out by the Military Department of the Philippine Government to open up undeveloped land and to build houses on this land suitable for living. These houses were all equipped with electric lights and drinking water installations, and many hospitals, schools and churches were also built. In the divisioning of this developed region, each 25 acres of land was divided into one small farm, and after construction was completed, the initial project covered approximately three thousand acres of ground. The Communist Party elements who surrendered were moved there and given sufficient land, housing, and equipment to live on, and allowed to pass a very satisfactory social life. In this way, the Communist Party elements all knew that the government had already given them peacefully what the Communist Party had promised them, and without any of the Communist conditions of forcefully taking over their thoughts, souls and sentiments. For this reason, the Communist Party elements began to wonder "What actual reason is there for us to remain in the mountains?" Therefore, they came down from the mountains in large numbers to pledge their allegiance, and not only did party followers defect, but top officials, such as TA-LI-LO (Ph.), Commander of the Manila District, KA-SI-TI-LU (Ph.), Commander of the 3rd Military District, and even TARUC, Communist Army Chief, also came down from the mountains to pledge their loyalty. (After TARUC surrendered, the Philippine Government refused to pardon him because of the extremely serious nature of his crimes, so they transferred his case to the courts where he was sentenced to prison for twelve years and fined \$10,000 (U.S.). Besides TARUC at that time, there were other Communist leaders such as PA-ERN-KO-SZU (Ph.), AH-LI-HAN-TE-NO (Ph.), and KA-SZU-TI-O (Ph.), and it was reported that PA-ERN-KO-SZU (Ph.) is now the secretary-general. The offices held by the others are not known.) Up to 1954, 9500 Communist followers and members surrendered voluntarily and were moved to the developed area. Up to the present time, they are still continuing to surrender and the developed areas are also gradually being expanded. Philippine President MAOSAYSAY once stated: "Effective military action has naturally caused the Communist Party heavy losses, but we cannot deny the success of the economic plan which was brought in countless Communist Party personnel to surrender to us."

In putting into effect its method of exterminating and providing care at the same time, the Philippine Government may have obtained initial success in its Communist-extermination work, but it cannot be

said that this alone could bring about the gradual tranquilization of the Communist menace, because, firstly, the Philippines is an important link in the "world revolution" being put into operation by the International Communist Party, and it will not sit and watch it being destroyed, but will wait for the opportunity to assist it and use every means to help it to revive. Secondly, the success of the so-called Communist-extermination work of the Philippine Government ends with the fact that militarily, it had destroyed the main force of the Communist Party, suppressed the remnant elements so that they cannot move, and furnished suitable arrangements for the Communist Party elements who have surrendered. However, this is a method of standard administration which can be claimed to have furnished a temporary measure of success. The method of administering to the roots is to resolve all the livelihood problems of the people within the country so that the Communist Party will have no means of creeping among the masses and growing again, otherwise it will be able to become alive again after being "aided" and "supported," as Philippine President MAGSAYSAY once stated: "The disease germs which causes a person to become a Communist are the lack of food and provisions, no rice to satisfy their hunger, poor political administration, and oppression by landlords," which means that these problems must be resolved before the Communist Party can be prevented from becoming reborn. Let us now take a look at how the Philippine Government resolved these problems. First, let's speak of resolving the land problem which is the most important of the problems of national economy, and which is a comparatively serious problem of the Philippines at present because its land system still maintains a form of colonization even up to the present time, its obstruction to agricultural production, economic expansion, and the establishment of a democratic political administration, is worse than in Japan prior to agrarian reforms, and its present tenant-farmer relationship is also worse than in Formosa before the "375" rent reduction. Among the twenty-two million people in the Philippines at the present time, seventy-five per cent are people in the peasant villages.

There are approximately 1.6 million peasant families in the entire country, among which 52.5 percent are families which own their land (including landlords and self-employed farmers), 9.9 per cent are semi-tenant farmers, 37.3 per cent are tenant farmers and .3 per cent are farm managers. Besides the percentage of tenant farmers have increased during the year, especially in the rice-producing districts in which the average is 55 per cent. The percentage of tenant farmers in some provinces go as high as 89 per cent. Furthermore, between the tenant and the landlord, the tenant is placed in a very disadvantageous position because the land rent is not only high but the tenant must perform various types of labor for the landlords as well. Although there is a joint tenant system as far as the general land rent regulations are concerned the landlords receive 40 per cent of the harvest (if you break down the expenses for seed, fertilizer, pestilence prevention, weeding, etc., the landlord actually receives more than one half), and the tenant receives 60 per cent; in the land-rent system, the rent is ruled to be approximately 30 per cent of the harvest (the landlord furnishes the land and all other things are taken care of by the tenant family, and regardless of the size of the harvest, the tenant must pay a specified rent to the landlord), but in practice, the majority does not follow this regulation and the actual amount of distribution is determined by the agreement signed by the two parties so that the landlord always "demands a high rate" and tenant is the one who must suffer. It is for this reason that there is ill feeling between the landlord and tenant which often results in conflict. Although the Philippine Government announced the Agrarian Reform Law two years ago, which, besides concentrating on improving the landlord-tenant relationship, also paid considerable attention to partitioning of large farms, establishment of self-employed farmers and to migration policies, but the regulations in this plan have yet to be put into practical execution and have produced no appreciable results in the resolution of numerous existing problems because of long-standing practices and customs.

Speaking further of economic problems, the work of building up production in the Philippines is progressing very slowly so that the problem of unemployment has become more and more serious, and according to Philippine official estimates, the present number of unemployed people totals from 1.3 million to 1.9 million approximately, which represents between 15 to 20 per cent of the eight million people throughout the nation who are

capable of working. After World War II, the population of the Philippines increased from 16 million to 22 million, an increase of almost 50 per cent but production did not increase proportionately. Of this 22 million population, there are approximately 150,000 people each year who reach the working age, but only about 25,000 are able to find employment so that on the average, more than 100,000 persons are added to the total number of unemployed people each year.

The lack of prosperous production has caused a rapid shrinkage in the foreign exchange reserve fund of the Philippines. In 1950, this foreign exchange reserve fund was 357 million U. S. dollars, but five years later, it decreased to 215 million U. S. dollars, a reduction of more than 50 per cent. Under these circumstances, WENG-TE-PA-NO (Ph), Chairman of the Philippine National Economic Committee, expressed publicly in January this year that he recognized that the future of the Philippines was dark and that the situation in the future was one of poverty and confusion. He blamed these conditions on the present Philippine Government's improper policy of conservative control of economy and recognized that a new economic line of active industrialization must be adopted, an ~~and~~ adventurous, bold economic line like that adopted by the United States.

As for the political administration, practices of corruption among the officials of the Philippine Government in the past were extremely serious. Since President MAGSAYSAY took office and determinedly decided to clean up by leading more than ^ahundred officials in publicly announcing their financial assets, there has been some meritorious achievement, but not entirely ideal as yet.

As for overseas Chinese affairs, there is a comparatively large number of overseas Chinese residing in the Philippines, approximately 200,000 who have always made great contributions towards economic prosperity in the Philippines and who have been positively active and made irrefutable achievements in the anti-Communist struggle. But the Philippine Government has consistently adopted a discriminative attitude towards the Chinese people, especially in the enforcement of the Philippine-Nationalization Law(?), which has threatened the existence of the overseas Chinese compatriots. Naturally, there is a very small number of worthless elements among the overseas Chinese, who, because they are dissatisfied with reality, become influenced by the poisonous propaganda of the Communists and secretly assist the

Communist Party in its activities. However, the Philippine Government has not tried to distinguish the black from the white and have confused the Communist problem and the overseas Chinese problems all into one issue, thinking that the overseas Chinese are all scheming with the Communist Party. Because of this, incidents in which the Philippine Government has deported the overseas Chinese without cause and in which overseas Chinese have been arrested at will have become so numerous that it has not been easy for any harmony and mutual understanding in the sentiments between the Philippine Government and the overseas Chinese.

With the existence of the above-mentioned facts, the Communist Party realized that they should take advantage of the opportunity and have engaged in their old art of infiltration on a grand scale, not only sending members to infiltrate the peasant villages, factories and cultural and educational organizations and institutions to strive to get the workers, peasants and intellectuals to join their organization and to serve their purposes (such as the peasant uprising in the province of Ta-Yen (Ph) in November 1949, which was instigated by the Communist Party), but also infiltrated Philippine Government organs and social organizations, becoming especially active in their efforts to gain the collaboration of the overseas Chinese. This became known in the numerous cases in which the Philippine Defense Ministry successively broke up many Chinese Communist organizations beginning on November 26 of last year, which revealed the fact that overseas Chinese youths and students were being used by the Communist Party and that since the main force of the Philippine Communists were destroyed by the Philippine Government in its extermination campaign, the Chinese Communists CHU and MAO had actually sent agents to infiltrate the Philippine Islands upon the orders of the Soviet Communist Party to expand its organization in the overseas Chinese society, to help direct the Philippine Communists and re-organize their organization, with plans to engage in seditious overthrow activities. Again, in April of this year, the Philippine Government discovered 1,518 Chinese Communist Party elements and 350 Indonesians successively trying to gain illegal entry into the country for the express purpose of destroying United States - Philippine relations and to encourage the Philippine people to oppose the United States in the hope of destroying the unity of the free nations. From all

the above facts, we know that the main force of the Philippine Communists have been destroyed by the government but they are still planning to rise up again and have not yet become idle. At the same time, the International Communist Party is still actively engaged in furnishing support to the Philippine Communist Party and besides supporting them with personnel and talent, it was also heard recently that large shipments of material resources were being smuggled in to assist it. Serious measures of defense and self-vigilance are necessary against all such things.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

DATE: 5/9/58

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
 IS - PHILIPPINES

Rememo 3/18/50.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a letterhead memorandum regarding the captioned matter which is furnished for information purposes.

Enclosures (5) ENCLOSURE
 RGK:vw
 (3)

REC-58

64-211-239-319

60 JUN 5 1958

64-200-239-320, 321

CHANGED TO

100-40-239-9X24, 9X25

DEC 1- 1958

ph

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 6/12/58

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES

Remylet 5/9/58.

Enclosed for information of the Bureau are
five copies of a memorandum relating to the new anti-
subversion law in the Philippines.

Enclosures (5)
HLC:uw
(4)

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R456 SEP 5 1961

REC-9

15 JUN 20 1958

ENCLOSURE
REC-9

NAT. INT. SEC.

52 JUN 30 1958

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 6/30/58

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES

Remylet 6/12/58.

Enclosed for information of the Bureau are five
copies of a memorandum relating to captioned matter.

Enclosures (5)
HLC:uw
(3)

W. C. Sullivan

REC-13

64-20-239-323

JUL 3 1958

5-ENCLOSURE

REC-13

57 JUL 9 1958

NAT. INT. SEC.

64-200-239-324, 325, 326

CHANGED TO

100-40-239-9x26, 9x27, 12

DEC 1 - 1958

ph

Director, FBI

8/19/58

Legat, Tokyo (105-43)

CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
IS - CH

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PH

Philippine Islands

Rebulet 8/7/58.

Pursuant to request by this office, Sergeant PABLO FERNANDO was contacted by representatives of OSI in Manila, P.I. on July 11, 14 and 16 in the effort to obtain a copy of the mimeographed circular. OSI advised by letter 8/5/58 that so far FERNANDO has been unable to locate the circular.

The writer will make every effort during road trip to Manila in late August, 1958 to obtain a copy of the circular.

HLC:uno
(3)

64-200-239
NOT RECORDED
47 AUG 21 1958

59 SEP 2 1958

100-40-239-10
ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-40-239-10

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8/25/58

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES

Remymemo 6/30/58.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a
letterhead memorandum regarding the captioned matter which
is being furnished for information purposes.

Enclosures (5)
RGK/mer
(3)

64 22 1-327
12 AUG 29 1958
NAT. INT. SEC.

59 SEP 8 1958

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10/20/58

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS
IS - PHILIPPINES

Remymemo 8/25/58.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a letterhead memorandum regarding the captioned matter which is being furnished for information purposes.

Enclosures (5)
RGK/mer
(3)

REC- 65

64-200-237-328

EX - 133

OCT 23 1958

REC- 65
ENCLOSURE

EX - 133

59 OCT 30 1958

NAV. INT. SEC.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.
October 20, 1958

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-02-2013
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~~SECRET~~

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (CPP)

On August 28, 1958, S. B. FAUSTO, National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, Philippines, furnished an analysis of the Communist Party of the Philippines, classified "~~Secret~~," which is hereinafter set forth in part.

"ORGANIZATION

"Generally, communist elements in the Philippines fall under three categories, namely: the members of the Party proper, the members of the Party's military organization, and the mass sympathizers.

"The members of the CPP are those who are inducted formally after undergoing a certain period of probation. They are conversant with and accept as their own the rules, programs and policies of the Party. They pay their dues regularly and participate actively in Party affairs. The People's Liberation Army (HMB) members compose the military arm of the Party. Generally, they are not Party members but due to the exigencies of the situation, some Party members joined the military ranks. The mass sympathizers are neither Party nor HMB members. They constitute the misguided and dissatisfied elements of labor and peasantry, generally, and are considered the first reserve of the CPP-HMB organization.

"Theoretically, the National Congress (NC) is the supreme ruling body of the Party. It lays down the national doctrine of the Party and sets overall policies in accordance with the provisions of its constitution.

"During its session, the NC elects a Central Committee (CC) out of its membership. Membership of the CC varies but, as decided in the CC conference of 1951, it is composed of 31 regular members and 10 alternates. Due to severe attrition that the Party has suffered, however, the membership has been reduced to 14 regulars and 6 alternates. The CC acts between congresses and resolves important general policies of the Party. It establishes and supervises all

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R456 SEP 5 1961

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ENCLOSURE

64-200-237-328

~~SECRET~~

subordinate organs and guides and administers all organizational and political activities of the Party. When the NC is not in session, the CC is the highest ruling body.

"Out of the CC membership, the Secretary General and an executive group, known as the Political Bureau or Politburo (PB), composed of 11 regular members and 3 alternates, are elected. The PB implements the doctrines and policies of the Party. It functions when neither the NC nor the CC is in session. Roughly, it corresponds to that of the cabinet. Membership in the PB manifests active and superior leadership in Party affairs. At present, there remain four (4) regular members and one (1) alternate of its original membership.

"Because of the impracticability for the entire PB membership to band together all the time for purposes of executing Party affairs, a super-executive group of 4 to 5 members is formed. This group is known as the Secretariat (SEC) and is headed by the Secretary General, who, actually, is the supreme head of the Party. Assisting the Secretary General in his functions are four principal organs, each headed by a chairman, namely: 1) The National Organization Department, (NOD); 2) The National Military Department (NMD); 3) The National Education Department (NED); and 4) The National Finance Department (NFD).

"The Regional Organization is the creation of the CC. It covers two or more provinces. When the Regional Convention is not in sessions, the Regional Committee (RECO) is the ruling organ. It acts on matters that are provincial or regional in nature and has the authority to make decisions within the purview of the constitution and overall policies of the Party.

"Among the mass, the organization is the Barrio Chapter (BC), whose officers are neither Party nor HMB members. It aids the enemy by giving food and other supplies, purchasing arms and ammunitions, and furnishing intelligence information. Otherwise known as the Barrio Defense Council, it is headed by a President, usually the Barrio Lieutenant, and has four committees, namely, peasant, laborer, women and youth committees. Each committee forms three groups of from 10 to 15 members.

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"THE CPP: ITS TACTICS AND POLICIES

"Recent pronouncements of leading Communists like Khrushchev that authority may be established simply thru 'peaceful,' i.e., 'parliamentary' means, or of Mao Tse-tung's 'Let a hundred flowers bloom' are all in keeping with 'peace,' the tactics of international communism and were made simply to lull the masses into a false sense of security. 'Peace' to the Communists means the 'absence of class conflict.' And when does class conflict end? When communism shall have been attained following the 'bloody' and 'violent' revolution.

"The 'parliamentary' form of struggle means that the Party avails itself of all the activities that are allowed by law or are exercised as a matter of right by citizens of a democratic stage, e.g., participation in elections, demonstrations, petitions, etc. One of its principal aims is to show the masses that this form of struggle is futile and that nothing can bring about the coup d'etat short of the 'armed' revolution. In the words of a highly qualified observer in the intelligence community, in the 'legal struggle' we find 'a subtle blending of superficial legality with substantial illegality.'

"These two forms of struggle, however, complement each other in the CP's attempt to seize national power. In the case of the CPP, the 'armed struggle' has been merely relegated to the background and the 'parliamentary' form given more emphasis.

"The employment of one form or the other depends on the situation of the revolution. When the situation is favorable, there is a 'flow' as in a tide; when the situation is unfavorable, there is an 'ebb.' Note the following table:

<u>"Situation</u>	<u>Form of Struggle</u>	<u>CP Posture</u>
'Flow' or 'rise' in revolution	'Armed'	'Offensive'
'Ebb' or 'decline' in revolution	'Parliamentary'	'Defensive'

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"Review of CPP Tactics

<u>Period</u>	<u>National Situation</u>	<u>CPP Tactical Policy</u>
Pre-war	Rise of Fascism	Legal struggle (right)
Early WW II	Japan Invades PI	United Front (right)
Late WW II	Japanese Occupation	United Front (right) Legal Struggle Armed Struggle
Liberation	Osmena administration Non-recognition of CPP local governments Arrest of top Huks Duly elected DA Con- gressmen unseated Roxas administration PKM-HMB outlawed	Armed struggle (left)
1949-1951	Economic crisis Generally low national morale due to fraud- terrorism in 1949 elections	Armed struggle (left)
1952-1954	Korean War Clean and peaceful elections Favorable economic conditions	Legal struggle (right)
1955-1956	Improved political and economic con- ditions	Legal struggle (right) intensified

"The Present Situation

"A characteristic approach of the CPP's present form of struggle is reflected in the following excerpts:

"The ... purpose is: a Filipinistic government ... which will be established through ... election. What is meant by a Filipinistic government? It is a government run by officials who are not sub-servient to foreigners ... A government which will

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not hesitate to pass and enforce laws and policies that will support the Filipino people, Filipino capitalists ... and Filipino proprietors ..."

"At first glance, these words would seem to have come from the lips of any legitimate and truly nationalistic Filipino campaigning for public office in the forthcoming elections. Actually, however, these were excerpts from Political Transmission No. 11, published by the CPP evidently in the middle of last year and which states in clear words the current tactical policy of the CPP.

"THE COMMUNIST SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES"

"The CPP-HMB registered in 1949-50 a peak strength of 12,800 members, 8,850 of which were armed, and a mass following of 54,200. In December 1956, active strength (in the field) was estimated to be 860 of which 560 were armed; mass following was placed at 21,000. The enemy strength as of 31 December 1957 was 657 active, with 449 arms, and a mass following of 16,746.

"The following is a comparative yearly CPP-HMB strength:

Year	Armed	Unarmed
1950	8,850	12,800
1951	5,150	7,300
1952	3,650	5,800
1953	1,600	2,600
1954	1,400	2,000
1955	830	1,170
1956	560	860
1957	449	208

"In view of CPP's shift in tactics, the infiltration potential of the CPP is strong. It can utilize surrendered or captured elements who have been released by the AFP. Infiltration for the purpose of influencing government policies (foreign and domestic) by infiltrating into policy determining positions is feasible but not an immediate capability of the CPP.

"The united front technique of the CPP may engender the growth of rural front organizations including perhaps a political party which may either assume a socialist or labor identification.

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"While it is true that the armed PKP strength has relatively decimated, the danger of agitation and propaganda activities still exist. As long as economic conditions remain fairly unstable, the CPP's propaganda potential is high. The battle of winning the masses still rages unabated. The CPP has recourse to exploit non-party organizations and non-party personalities espousing views similar or identical with the tactical orientation of the PKP on basic national issues.

"Following a policy of retrenchment, the PKP-HMB recently started placing extra-heavy stress on strengthening the quality of its ranks. To successfully pursue its long-range plan of legal struggle, prevent defections of its demoralized and depleted ranks, and prevent the recurrence of factional rifts as a result of 'ideological confusion' among leaders and cadres, the enemy is concentrating a hard-core, well oriented communist movement. Intensive indoctrination appears to be the key. Although no party school has been known to open since last year, indoctrination is being stepped up vigorously.

"A vulnerable spot of the movement was the result of differences in ideology, disagreement on party issues and policies, and the struggle for party leadership. It caused the alignment of forces within the party to the detriment of organizational unity and discipline. Party members, having been witnesses to the struggle are now doubtful of the integrity and solidity of the party.

"Mass support has been continuously waning and active strength has been greatly reduced. Recruitment and building of its reserves will remain an urgent CPP-HMB need.

"The insufficiency of funds has greatly caused the weakening of the movement. The dissidents have resorted to extortions and kidnappings to get the needed funds."

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Director, FBI

DATE: 12/23/58

Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES

Reylet 10/20/58.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a letterhead memorandum regarding the captioned matter which is being furnished for information purposes. It is being tentatively classified as "~~Secret~~" since the information was obtained from reports of the Office of Special Investigation, District Office No. 2, Philippines, which have that classification.

Enclosure
RGK-ENCLOSURE (3)

H. O. Sullivan (Info)
M. J. Sullivan (Info)
[Signature]

EX. 101

REC- 82

REC- 81

EX-101

23 JAN 3 1959

NAT/INT. SEC.

66 JAN 19 1959

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. NEASE

DATE: JAN 9 1959

FROM : L. E. SHORT

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY
Philippine Islands
INTERNAL SECURITY - PI

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Bulky Exhibit File Number: 64-200-239-168X

We are in the process of reviewing all bulky exhibits in order that we may dispose of those which serve no further purpose. Inasmuch as many of the bulky exhibits pertain to inactive cases and are occupying badly needed space, it is requested that the appropriate substantive supervisor review the above-listed bulky exhibit and render a decision as to its retention or disposition. A notation as to the decision reached may be placed on this memorandum. The memorandum should be returned to the Filing Unit of the Records Branch, Room 1113, Identification Building, for filing in the case file.

RECOMMENDATION:

That captioned bulky exhibit be reviewed and a decision rendered as to the retention or disposition of the material.

Done
1/15/59
gbh:gbh

64-200-239-
NOT RECORDED
2 JAN 19 1959

57 JAN 20 1959

See addendum, page two.

J. W. MARSHALL

ADDENDUM:

HWE:mlj *CP in the* January 13, 1959

Bulky material is comprised of two copies (307 pages each) of an OSI publication titled "Essential Elements of Information" dated 6/15/51. This publication is a compilation of data received by OSI during the period of 6/1/49 to 4/1/51 on the Republic of the Philippines and is divided into two sections: Section I, Organizations, and Section 2, Personalities, within each individual's affiliation set out where known. One copy of the publication has been thoroughly indexed and there appears no need for retention of the extra copy. In view of identifying data on the various Philippine organizations and each individual, one document is considered of value from an intelligence standpoint.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that the indexed copy of the publication be retained and the extra copy destroyed.
2. It is further recommended that the copy retained be forwarded to the Repair Section of the Records Division in order that it might be repaired and needed pages of the extra copy inserted in the copy to be retained. It is also recommended that the copy retained be rebound.

M
SP/ham
gbs
BSW

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. NEASE
FROM : L. E. SHORT
SUBJECT: C. P. - PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

DATE: 1/7/59

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Bulky Exhibit File Number: 64-200-239-271

We are in the process of reviewing all bulky exhibits in order that we may dispose of those which serve no further purpose. Inasmuch as many of the bulky exhibits pertain to inactive cases and are occupying badly needed space, it is requested that the appropriate substantive supervisor review the above-listed bulky exhibit and render a decision as to its retention or disposition. A notation as to the decision reached may be placed on this memorandum. The memorandum should be returned to the Filing Unit of the Records Branch, Room 1113, Identification Building, for filing in the case file.

RECOMMENDATION:

That captioned bulky exhibit be reviewed and a decision rendered as to the retention or disposition of the material.

JMS:gbh

ADDENDUM:

Material consisting of transcript of testimony, in English, of trial of Communist Politburo in Philippines, was volunteered to the Bureau in 1954 by Honorable Robert G. Simmons, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nebraska. Forwarded to Bureau per request of Inspector W. C. Sullivan. (Serial 270) Material may be destroyed as it no longer serves any valuable purpose, per Inspector Sullivan.

JMS:njl

64-200-239-
NOT RECORDED
25 JAN 21 1959

J. W. MARSHALL

Destroyed 6/12/68

57 JAN 21 1959

-(SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO)

1 Schaefer
1 Moore

Legal Attache, Tokyo (105-637)

3-13-59

REC-25 Director, FBI (64-200-239) - 3-31
EX-101 COMMUNIST PARTY OF PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES


Reurlet 2-17-59.

Inasmuch as Bufiles indicate your office has been submitting information to the Bureau on a regular basis concerning the captioned matter and you maintain regular contacts with your sources for this purpose, there is no objection to your maintaining this case in a pending status.

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

GCM:ew (6)

NOTE: In view of our interest from an over-all intelligence standpoint on activities of Communist Party of the Philippines and since Legat, Tokyo, regularly contacts its sources for info in this regard and submits results on regular basis, felt Legat is correct in keeping case in pending status.



Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

60 MAR 19 1959

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

EBT
60 MAR 19 1959

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 2/17/59

H2012

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES

Remylet 12/23/58.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a letterhead memorandum regarding the captioned matter which is being furnished for information purposes.

This matter is being kept in a pending status, since it is of continuing interest, and inquiries on the subject matter are made regularly of contacts of this office.

C

Enclosures (5)
RGK/mer
(3)

12

REC-28 64-200-237-331

24 FEB 25 1959

5 ENCLOSURE

*105
let to Legat, Tokyo
3/13/59
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AGENCY	STATE - CIA
REQ. REC'D	
DATE FORW.	10-22-59
HOW FORW.	R/S 0-14
BY	TRM

SEC.

*W. J. Sullivan
(info)
H. O. B. (info)*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (64-200-239)

DATE: 4/21/59

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (105-637)

Philippine IslandsSUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
IS - PHILIPPINES

Remylet 2/17/59.

Enclosed are the original and four copies of a letterhead memorandum regarding the captioned matter which is being furnished for information purposes.

This matter is being kept in a pending status, since it is of continuing interest, and inquiries on the subject matter are regularly made of contacts of this office.

Enclosures (5)

RGK/mer

(3)

0-1 Legat, Tokyo (3)

6.23.59

Tokyo reply 7/6/59 "Report"

Submitted 6.16.59.

② H.O. B. 4/10/59
DW. 10/1/59
SULLIVAN

AGENCY State - CIA
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 10-22-59
HOW FORW. R/S 0-14
BY

12 APR 28 1959

62 MAY 6 1959

ENCLOSURE

64-200-239-332

NAT. SEC. 332

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

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Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 86

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